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1.1  Overview of the Apprenticeship System 
A great deal of  research has been done on the German apprenticeship sys- 
tem. This includes excellent accounts of  the operation of  the system: Hayes 
and Fonda (1984) still provide the best overall picture in English. The Euro- 
pean Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) mono- 
graph on vocational training in Germany contains a wealth of  information, 
including a treatment of  the legal aspects (Munch 1991). Casey (1991) and 
Lane (1991) have useful analyses of more recent developments, the latter relat- 
ing the system to changes in the patterns of work organization. Streeck et al. 
(1987) is authoritative on the role of institutions. Finally, and most important, 
is the  series of  articles produced  by  the research group (Prais, Steedman, 
Wagner, and others) at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
in London: based on comparative research with the United Kingdom, these 
provide a wide range of  insights into the operation of  the German training 
system within companies, the impact of skills on company performance, ap- 
prenticeship examination procedures and standards, and prior educational per- 
formance (Steedman, Mason, and Wagner 1991; Steedman and Wagner 1987; 
Prais 1987, 1981; Prais, Jarvis, and Wagner  1989; Prais and Wagner 1988, 
1985, 1983; Daly, Hitchens, and Wagner 1985). All of the above literature dis- 
cusses the system as it has operated in the former West  Germany, and this 
paper will also concentrate attention on the former West. 
This literature, however, does not systematically examine the apprenticeship 
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system from the perspective of the incentives which face the different actors.’ 
It does not show how infrastructural institutions are able to develop incentives 
for companies and individuals which resolve the standard market-failure prob- 
lems involved in training in marketable  skills. Nor does it discuss how the 
system functions as an equilibrium, in which the actors have no incentive to 
behave differently.*  The purpose of this paper is to redress this imbalance and 
to provide a simplified and stylized model of the system, which does not intend 
to do justice to its complexities. Instead it seeks to understand the system’s 
more important incentive structures and the role of infrastructural institutions 
in generating them. 
This leads to an important qualification about the paper. Because it seeks 
to understand behavior in rational-actor terms, it focuses on some questions 
(particularly those about the opportunity costs involved in certain courses of 
action) which do not appear to have been the subject of serious empirical re- 
search in Germany. In consequence, at several points in the paper we resort 
to back-of-the-envelope calculations. The paper should therefore be seen as a 
treatment of future research directions, as well as an essay on how the system 
works. 
1.1.1 
Though the figures are slowly changing, over 60 percent of each cohort go 
into apprenticeships, about 30 percent go into higher education, and about 5 
percent drop out. Apprentices start between the ages of  16 and 19, after sec- 
ondary education, and participate three to four years. The apprenticeship is a 
legal contract between employer and apprentice: there is an initial probationary 
period of  one to three months, and subsequent termination by  the employer 
before the completion of the apprenticeship is legally difficult and is, in fact, 
unusual. Secondary education takes two broad forms: schools mainly for those 
going into apprenticeships at age 16 (Hauptschule and Realschule), with the 
Hauptschule at a lower academic level than the Realschule; and schools mainly 
for those going into higher education, (Gymnasia).  Recent years have seen a 
steady increase in the number of apprentices with a university entry certificate 
(Abitur);  in 1989, 14 percent of apprentices held an Abitul; 32 percent gradua- 
ted from Realschule, and 35 percent graduated from Hauptschule. 
Apprenticeships cover a wide range of occupations, and there is, hardly sur- 
prisingly, a strong gender bias. In 1989, the five most common apprenticeships 
for men were: 
A Brief Description of the System 
1. The notable exception to this is Franz (1982). This paper develops his approach to the endo- 
geneity of  quits. 
2. Some of  these concepts are suggested in Finegold and Soskice (1988) in a comparative con- 
text, in particular the distinction between a “high-skill, quality production” equilibrium character- 
izing Germany and a “low-skill, standardized production” equilibrium characterizing the United 
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auto mechanic (7.8 percent of all male apprentices), 
electrician (5.2 percent), 
joiner (3.2 percent), 
clerical worker-wholesale  and trade (3.2 percent), and 
bank clerk (2.9 percent); 
for women, the five most common apprenticeships were: 
9  hairdresser (7.7 percent of all female apprentices), 
clerical worker-small  shop (6.9 percent), 
clerical worker-office  (6.8 percent), 
medical assistant (6.3 percent), and 
clerical worker-industry  (6.0 percent)  (Bundesministerium fur Bildung 
und Wissenschaft [BMBW] 1991,30). 
These figures should not be equated with the prestige of  different appren- 
ticeships. Prestige can be loosely determined by  looking at the educational 
background of  young people entering different apprenticeships. For instance, 
in  1989, the five apprenticeships with the highest proportions of Abitur hold- 
ers were: 
clerical worker-insurance  (60.4 percent, or 8,200, were Abitur holders), 
bank clerk (59.0 percent, or 3,190), 
social insurance worker (42.2 percent, or 4,200), 
clerical worker-industry  (41.2 percent, or 9,000), and 
clerical worker-shipping  (40.6 percent, or 5,000). 
By contrast, in 1989, the five apprenticeships with the highest proportions of 
Hauptschule dropouts were: 
homehelp (51.8 percent, or 1,400, were Hauptschule dropouts), 
housepainter (12.9 percent, or 3,600), 
butcher (1  1.8 percent, or 1,300), 
blacksmith (1  1  .O percent, or 2,300), and 
baker (9.3 percent, 2,000) (BMBW 1991). 
Apprenticeship is often known as the “dual” system, since apprentices re- 
ceive training both within the companies to which they are apprenticed and 
within publically run vocational schools. These schools generally supply the 
more theoretical aspects of training: apprentices spend one to two days a week 
in vocational school. Within companies, particularly the larger ones, a high 
portion of the training may be in company training shops, rather than on the 
job. In smaller companies, off-the-job training is often provided in group train- 28  David Soskice 
ing centers, each used by a group of companies. The apprenticeship program 
is highly structured, with minimum legal requirements for material which must 
be covered; there is an external examination at the end of the apprenticeship, 
in both theoretical and practical knowledge, and a worker must pass this to 
gain a skilled worker’s  certificate (there is about a  10 percent failure rate). 
The company is legally responsible for the adequacy of  its arrangements for 
apprentice training, and companies can only gain approval to undertake such 
training if they can show inter alia that they have properly qualified  trainer^.^ 
Employees of companies that train represent about 70 percent of total em- 
ployment. Nearly all large and most medium-sized companies undertake ap- 
prenticeship training. The proportion of small companies that do so is much 
lower, though in aggregate these companies make almost as great a contribu- 
tion. There is an important institutional distinction in Germany between the 
handwerk, or crafthisanal, sector (which includes auto repair shops, bakeries, 
small electrical concerns, and hairdressers) and the industnalkommercial sec- 
tor; this roughly separates small concerns from medium-sized and larger ones. 
Of total apprenticeships in 1989, 50.4 percent were in the industrialkommer- 
cia1 sector, and 34.3 percent in the handwerk sector. (In addition to these two, 
there are three other, smaller, but significant apprenticeship sectors: agriculture 
with  2.2 percent of  apprentices in  1989, civil service with 4.0 percent, and 
assistantships in the “free professions,” such as accountancy and law, with 8.3 
percent; we do not discuss these areas in this paper.) 
Buttressing the apprenticeship system is a complex of institutions. The most 
important of  these are the sectoral employer associations and the local em- 
ployer associations, the chambers of industry and commerce, and the handwerk 
chambers. The main roles of  the employer associations are in developing new 
apprenticeships and modifying existing ones, as well as in advising larger com- 
panies; the chambers are responsible for organizing the local apprenticeship 
system, approving and monitoring company training, and running the examina- 
tion system. The industrial unions work closely both with sectoral associations 
and with the chambers, and within companies, the employee-elected works 
councils are entitled to influence and monitor apprenticeship programs, exten- 
sively.  The  regional  governments  are  responsible  for  vocational  schools, 
though these responsibilities are, in practice, carried out in close cooperation 
with the employer associations and the unions. The regional governments co- 
ordinate,  with  each  other,  curricular  developments  concerning  vocational 
schools; here again the social partners are heavily involved. Finally, the federal 
government is responsible for the framework legislation relating to training 
within companies; it also devotes major resources to research and policy for- 
3.  Trainers require a certificate showing that they have undergone training to be a trainer. This 
is usually done as part of the course of studies leading to a supervisory (meister) qualification; this 
qualification is only open to already skilled workers and serves to deepen their technical compe- 
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mation,  through  the  Federal  Institute for  Vocational Training  (the BiBB) 
(Streeck et al. 1987). 
1.1.2  Solving Market-Failure Problems 
Since  Becker’s  classic  statement  of  the  distinction  between  company- 
specific skills and marketable skills, it has been generally accepted that a so- 
cially optimal provision of  marketable skills will be reached by competitive 
markets only under assumptions which are unlikely to hold (Becker 1964). 
Thus, no company will be prepared to invest in training its employees in mar- 
ketable skills, since after training, either the company pays its employees the 
market wage for the skills, in which case it will be less costly to hire the skills 
from the market, or the company pays its employees less than the market rate, 
in which case its employees quit. Thus, in equilibrium, individuals have  to 
finance fully any training in  marketable skills-which  leads to the second 
problem: the greater the cost to individuals of such an investment, the more 
likely it is that they will have to resort to b~rrowing.~  Financial markets face 
adverse selection difficulties from such borrowing, because, if banks set premi- 
ums  reflecting  average success rates, individuals who believe they  have  a 
higher-than-average probability of successfully acquiring the skills will choose 
to pay  a larger proportion of the cost themselves-thus  forcing the banks to 
finance a greater proportion of the riskier trainees.s These “classic” problems 
are visible in both the United Kingdom and the United States, where relatively 
few companies are prepared to spend substantial resources on the initial train- 
ing of  lower-level employees and where banks do not finance apprentices. 
A second problem area is the existence of an equilibrium. Assume that the 
Becker problem can be solved (by whatever means) as long as the cost to com- 
panies of providing training in marketable skills is low enough. A central ele- 
ment in keeping costs low is the educational level of apprentices. Specifically, 
assume that companies are prepared to invest in training if the academic level 
of potential apprentices is high enough. Also assume that schoolchildren are 
prepared to invest in effort at school to attain this academic level if the proba- 
bility of getting an apprenticeship is high enough, that is, if enough apprentice- 
ships are offered by companies. Then there may be two possible equilibria, 
one in which companies offer apprenticeships and schoolchildren work hard 
and one in which companies do not offer apprenticeships and children do not 
work hard. Clearly the “low-skill” equilibrium does not exist under standard 
conditions of  perfect competition, if both children and companies prefer the 
“high-skill” equilibrium. But if  (among many possible explanations) search 
costs for potential apprentices depend on the number of apprenticeships being 
4. Along an  optimal income-consumption  path with standard conditions, the investment would 
5. There are also likely to be moral hazard problems. These arise if performance cannot be 
always be financed partly by borrowing. 
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offered and search costs for companies offering apprenticeships depend on the 
number of academically suitable young people, then a low-skill equilibrium is 
possible.  Such a low-skill equilibrium can then reinforce the classic market- 
failure problems to which Becker pointed. The German apprenticeship system 
appears to solve each of these problems. 
First, the costs of training young people in marketable skills are shared by 
the regional government, apprentices, and companies. The regional govern- 
ment pays for the public-education side of the training. Apprentices “pay” by 
accepting low salaries throughout their apprenticeships.6 Companies  pay all 
costs of in-company training.’ For a range of companies (as we will see) there 
may be a net current profit from apprenticeships. But for apprenticeships in 
higher-level  skills, that is not the case. These companies are not legally re- 
quired to train,8 and they give every appearance of being interested in maximiz- 
ing long-term profits. Successful completion of  apprenticeship training leads 
to a skilled worker’s certificate: there appears to be widespread acceptance in 
Germany of skill certificates, and there are active external occupational labor 
markets (Schettkat 1991).  Thus a main question in this paper is, Why do com- 
panies  invest in  training  apprentices  in marketable  skills (see sections  1.2 
and 1.3)? 
Second, the educational level of German children who do not go on to higher 
education is high by U.K. and U.S. standards. This is established both by inter- 
national comparative testing and by more detailed U.K.-Geman comparisons 
of examination content and pass rates in certain subjects, notably mathematics. 
Moreover,  the  disciplinary  problems  which  arise  in  many  U.K.  and  U.S. 
schools do not appear to be so severe in Germany. We show in section 1.4 that 
there is a clear incentive structure, related  to the apprenticeship system, for 
German children to work hard at school. Thus Germany does appear to be in 
a high-training, high-education equilibrium. 
The German system appears to solve some of the main market-failure prob- 
lems associated with marketable skills. The goal of  this paper is to focus on 
how it does so, rather than on showing that it does so-though,  as far as pos- 
sible, supporting references are given. In the next two subsections, we look at 
elements of the structure of product and labor markets, which provide building 
blocks in the story, and then at critical ways in which institutions operate in 
relation to the apprenticeship system. 
6. The market-failure problem associated with borrowing does not arise in a major way, since 
young people are prepared to accept low wages, and this acceptance together with company and 
state financing is sufficient to cover net apprenticeship costs. (The market-failure problem still 
exists but not in so malign a form: for the apprentice, optimal income-consumption paths generally 
imply spreading the apprenticeship costs between borrowing and low wages, with consumption 
unaltered; financial institutions generally do not allow this, so a welfare loss results.) 
7. The construction industry is an exception to this: companies which do not train pay a levy 
instead, which then subsidizes training in other companies. 
8. There may be institutional pressures of an informal nature exerted on some companies if they 
do not train or do not train enough, but this does not appear to be a major reason that companies 
run apprenticeship schemes. 31  Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System 
Table 1.1  Distribution of Employment Tenure of Male Employees in Selected 
Countries (as a % of all male employees) 
Japan 
(includes 
Tenure in Present Job  Germany  United Kingdom  United States  women) 
5-10  years  18.9  21.5  12.2  18.8 
10-20  years  28.8  21.9  19.2  26.1 
Over 20 years  19.8  14.1  13.1  21.9 
Total (over 5 years)  61.5  58.1  45.1  66.8 
Source: Buchtemann (1991). 
1.1.3  Product-Market and Labor-Market Structures 
The Relationship between Internal and External Labor Markets 
One view of  German labor markets, proposed by  Marsden  (1990), is that 
they are occupational: workers’ skills are largely marketable and workers lose 
little by moving from one company to another, just as companies lose little by 
having  to hire new  workers.  Marsden  contrasts occupational  labor markets 
with internal labor markets, in which workers remain for long periods of time 
acquiring company-specific skills. 
Marsden  is correct  in  the  view  that  German  external  labor  markets  for 
skilled occupations are effective. He is wrong, however, in his view of internal 
labor markets: most German companies operate internal labor markets, and we 
will argue in the next section that this is central to the success of the apprentice- 
ship system. The importance of internal labor markets in Germany can be seen 
by looking at data on the length of workers’ attachment to companies. In table 
I.  1, tenure rates are shown, comparing different countries, and it can be seen 
that tenure is significantly longer in Germany than in the United States or the 
United Kingdom, although tenure in Japan is even longer than in Germany. A 
standard difficulty with using these figures for comparative inferences about 
internal labor markets is the frequency of job change in the United States at 
the start of careers; table 1.2 avoids this difficulty by showing the probability 
of remaining in a company, given an existing tenure of 3-5  or 5-10  years: this 
confirms the view that German employees have significantly longer tenure than 
do American workers. 
The relationship between  internal and external labor markets is along the 
following lines, which will be developed and qualified later in the paper. The 
usual port of entry to skilled work in an internal labor market is via an appren- 
ticeship. Employment security is in the interest of both management and the 
skilled worker, and skilled workers can normally expect long tenure. 
External occupational labor markets play a secondary role, albeit a signifi- 
cant one. Skilled workers lose their jobs in internal labor markets because com- 
panies fail, markets decline and the company cannot avoid making redundanc- 32  David Soskice 
Table 1.2  Probability of Achieving 20+-Year Job Tenure in the United States 
and  Germany, 1979-84 (%) 
Current Tenure 
Age Group  3-5  Years  5-10  Years 
20-24  years 
United States 
Germany 
25-29  years 
United States 
Germany 
30-34  years 
United States 
Germany 
35-39  years 
United States 
Germany 
29.4  19.4 
31.9  50.1 
33.3  36.7 
44.9  62.2 
33.0  48.4 
38.6  12.3 
28.1  47.5 
45.7  83.5 
Source: Biichtemann (1991). 
ies, workers perform inadequately, or workers want to leave their employment 
for personal reasons. These constitute the supply to external labor markets. 
Companies setting up new plants, wanting to expand rapidly, or needing skills 
they cannot train for themselves constitute the demand. 
The primary role of internal labor markets is central to the operation of the 
apprenticeship system, because it leads at least large and medium-sized com- 
panies  to believe they can retain the apprentices they have trained  and be- 
cause-insofar  as the apprenticeship is the main port of entry to internal labor 
markets-it  gives young people a strong incentive to gain an apprenticeship in 
those companies. We will need to discuss more carefully in subsequent sec- 
tions what the incentives for both companies and young people are and how 
they are buttressed by institutions. But as an overview, we can say: Access to 
the internal labor market is the primary goal of the apprenticeship, at least in 
most  large and  medium-sized  companies.  In  those companies,  the  skilled 
worker’s certificate is an insurance policy in case the need to move arises, ne- 
cessitating use of the external labor market. 
The IndustrialJCommercial Sector and the Small-Firm Sector 
Not all apprenticeships are of equal quality or standing. This is true within 
the same company and across companies in the same industry, or sector, as will 
be discussed shortly. There are also a range of industries, nearly all comprising 
small firms in the handwerk sector-including  small retail establishments, res- 
taurants, garages, bakeries, and traditional craft makers-where  we can dis- 
cern an apprenticeship different from that just sketched. Apprentices here typi- 
cally have a worse educational background than those in larger companies, as 
shown in subsection  1.1.1. There is a much lower postapprenticeship rate of 33  Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System 
“staying on” in the same company, and much of the semiskilled work force in 
larger companies is recruited from workers trained in this sector. Simplifying 
considerably, we propose a dual model and try to explain how behavior in both 
sectors may be rational. 
Apprenticeship Entry as a Rank-Order Tournament 
Apprenticeships in the industrialkommercial sector are more attractive than 
those in  the handwerk sector. This is part of  a more general phenomenon: 
School-leavers rank apprenticeships across sectors and companies, and even 
within companie~.~  Within a region or a locality, schoolchildren and their par- 
ents, as well as their schoolteachers, will usually have a clear idea of the best 
companies with which to apprentice and of how companies compare. The atti- 
tude toward potential apprenticeships among German schoolchildren who are 
not going to higher education is similar to that toward potential university 
places among American schoolchildren who are going on to higher education. 
We  shall argue that the possibility of  getting a better apprenticeship produces 
an incentive structure for German children to work hard at school, independent 
of their ability level. Equally, companies are interested in getting the best ap- 
prentices. Therefore they pay close attention to school performance and pro- 
vide their own testing procedures, as well. This reinforces the incentive struc- 
ture for schoolchildren. 
1.1.4  The Role of Infrastructural Institutions 
Much  discussion in  the Anglo-American literature on  initial vocational 
training is devoted-quite  properly-to  the question of  how to establish ap- 
propriate incentive structures to induce companies and young people to invest 
in training: these incentives range from legal requirements to a wide variety of 
fiscal incentives. This type of discussion is much less important in Germany. 
The incentives for companies and young people to invest in apprenticeships 
are not, for the most part, direct. The incentives stem from the need of German 
companies to have highly skilled work forces, the perception by many compa- 
nies that it is advantageous to undertake the training themselves, and the conse- 
quent desire of young people to be trained for those careers.’O 
The Central Indirect Role of Institutions 
Infrastructural institutions play a central indirect role in establishing incen- 
tives for companies to provide training. As will be discussed in the next sec- 
tion, the operation of  the German financial system, allowing companies to 
adopt a long-term financial perspective, combined with the industrial relations 
system, making low-cost labor strategies difficult, pushes companies in com- 
9. This last point-the  range of apprenticeships offered by  the same company, from the most 
10. The story for handwerk apprenticeships is slightly different but does not depend on direct in- 
sought after to those which are less attractive-has  been stressed by Hilary Steedman. 
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petitive markets toward high-quality production using highly skilled labor in 
internal labor markets. And the operation of  the relatively coordinated wage 
bargaining system reinforces market incentives for most companies in compet- 
itive sectors to meet their skill needs by training rather than by using the exter- 
nal labor market. 
Research, Advice, and Monitoring: The Direct Role of Company-jiiendly 
Institutions 
Any system of company-provided-structured training leading to marketable 
skills requires companies to cooperate fully and openly with training institu- 
tions, both to get advice on establishing and updating training schemes and to 
be monitored. Where the training institution is a state agency, many companies 
are wary of such exposure, and where the infrastructure of vocational training 
is run by the state, as in France, it proves difficult to involve companies. It is 
of the greatest importance that in Germany the institutions concerned directly 
with advising and monitoring companies are primarily the chambers and sec- 
toral employer associations and secondarily the works councils (with whom 
companies generally have high-trust relations). 
The close relationship between companies and employer associations, in VO- 
cational training, has significant consequences for the research, development, 
and diffusion of new training practices and for the process of defining new and 
augmenting existing apprenticeships, It means that employer associations have 
expertise in working out training solutions for companies in  many different 
situations, and it provides a good way  of  diffusing best practice. To  a lesser 
extent, unions  acquire  similar  expertise working  with  and  advising  works 
councils. 
Institutions, Rules, and Sanctions 
Employer associations, including chambers, have significant informal sanc- 
tioning ability over companies. The German system of government delegates 
as much authority as possible to private associations (of which business associ- 
ations are important examples) to administer broadly defined policies."  Be- 
cause policies are broadly  defined, private associations have discretion over 
how they are carried out. Thus they are usually in a strong bargaining position 
vis-a-vis individual companies. 
This does not mean that formal or informal sanctioning plays a significant 
direct role in the operation of the apprenticeship system. Companies are free 
both by law and (as far as we can see) in practice not to take part in the appren- 
ticeship system, and many companies, including the majority of smaller ones, 
choose not to. If companies do take apprentices, they must accept being moni- 
tored,  but  most  companies  outside  the  handwerk  sector  train  to  above- 
minimum standards and so are unlikely to come into disagreement with the 
chambers. 
11. See the important article by Streeck and  Schmitter (1985). 35  Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System 
1.2  Why Do Companies Train Apprentices? 
The cost of  training apprentices is partly borne by  the apprentices them- 
selves: they accept a low wage, and they bring to the apprenticeship a good 
academic background. The state (i.e., the regional government) pays, in that it 
meets the full costs of the public vocational schools to which apprentices go 
on day or block release. Some companies, usually small ones, get public sub- 
sidies to provide training facilities or to meet the needs of particular trainees 
in particular areas. In one industry, construction, there is a levy on all compa- 
nies-operated  by  the employer association-to  cover, in part, the costs of 
companies which carry out training. Apart from the above, the costs of  in- 
house training are borne by the companies doing the training. If these costs are 
positive and if  the apprenticeships result in marketable skills, why do compa- 
nies finance them? As explained in the overview, this is the standard market- 
failure problem of training in marketable skills; it is perhaps the most widely 
discussed problem in the policy literature. 
There is no doubt that under some circumstances, particularly during reces- 
sions, institutional pressures may be applied to companies to take apprentices. 
But most observers doubt this is typical: most companies which are involved 
in apprenticeship programs do not appear to take apprentices as a result of 
institutional pressure. An  alternative possibility is that  German companies, 
while responsible for the costs of in-house training, reduce the quality of  the 
training to eliminate these costs.'2 Here again the evidence, summarized in 
section 1.4, suggests that German companies do not behave in this way.  In any 
case, it is clear from table 1.3 that, at least for many companies, training costs 
are positive, and for some companies and sectors strongly so. The relevant 
figure here, in column (6) of table 1.3, is the net cost to the company incurred 
during the apprenticeship (i.e., on the assumption that the company gets no 
subsequent benefits from the apprentice). 
These figures on the costs to employers of  training also show wide disper- 
sion across sectors. In explaining why companies train, this paper returns to 
the distinction drawn in the overview between two broad sectors of companies: 
medium-sized and larger companies in the industrialkommercial sector and 
smaller artisanal companies in the handwerk sector. In the first sector, responsi- 
ble for about 50 percent of  apprenticeships, a high proportion of apprentices 
are retained by  their companies when their apprenticeships have been comp- 
leted, as can be seen in table 1.4. Table  1.4 does not break companies down 
between the handwerk and industrialkommercial sectors but a good indication 
can be gained by  comparing the differences between companies with more 
than 500 employees, all in the industrialkommercial sector, and those with 
fewer than 50 employees, most of which will be in the handwerk sector. 
The  handwerk  sector trains  about  one-third of  all apprentices; a  much 
12. The mathematics of  how companies which can vary the relative amounts of  time spent in 
training and time spent in productive work will reduce the amount of training to eliminate training 
costs is contained in Oulton and Steedman (1992). 36  David Soskice 




Training  Apprentice  Additional  Gross  Output  Net 
Personnel  Wages  Costs  Costs  Contribution  Costs 
Sec  tor/Size  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
IndustriaYcommercial sector 
>  1  ,OOO  employees  3,467  8,944  4,303  16,714  2,404  14,310 
<  1,000 employees  6,036  7,292  2,330  15,658  4,695  10,963 
Handwerk sector  7,605  5,960  1,006  14,571  7,323  7,248 
Source: Falk (1982). 
Note; (4) = (1) + (2) + (3); (6) = (4) -  (5). 
smaller proportion of apprentices in the handwerk sector remain with the com- 
pany which trained them; the skill content of apprenticeships is lower, as is the 
educational background of the apprentices; and a significant proportion leave 
the sector to gain semiskilled blue- and white-collar work in larger companies. 
This paper argues that profit-maximizing companies in the two sectors have 
different reasons for undertaking apprenticeship training  and hence that it is 
useful to analyze the German system in two sectors. Without  question this 
distinction is too sharply drawn:  there are many high-skill  small companies 
which provide training with high skill content, just as there are large compa- 
nies which do not. Moreover, within the larger companies, there are different 
levels of apprenticeship. Despite these qualifications, we believe it casts light 
on the German system to make this sectoral distinction. 
Why do larger companies bear some of the cost of training apprentices in 
marketable skills? This question will be answered in four parts. (1) The finan- 
cial and industrial relations systems provide incentives for companies to oper- 
ate internal labor markets for skilled employees; this requires companies to 
choose  between  carrying  out  their  own  training  and hiring  already-skilled 
workers on the external market. (2) The net costs to companies of apprentice- 
ship training are relatively low because of the educational and financial invest- 
ment made by apprentices and because of the supportive advice and monitor- 
ing  provided  by  company-friendly  institutions.  (3)  The  probability  that 
apprentices whom the company wants to retain postapprenticeship will agree 
to stay depends on whether other companies meet their own  skill needs by 
training apprentices or by seeking to hire postapprentices trained elsewhere: if 
the former, the quit rate will be low because good positions will be hard to 
find; if  many  companies  do not train, the  quit rate may be higher. (4) The 
decision whether to meet skill needs by training apprentices depends on the 
costs of hiring postapprentices trained elsewhere versus the costs of training 
enough apprentices in-house, taking into account the potential quit rate. The 37  Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System 
Table 1.4  Retention Rates and Nontraining Rates by Company Size, 1985 Sample 
Survey 
Postapprenticeship Retention Rate of 
Apprentices  Percentage of  Companies 













65  143 
41  624 
22  389 
09  46 1 
0.5  372 
0.4  377 
Suurce: Buchtemann (1989) 
costs of external hiring are potentially high for two reasons: First, company- 
specific skills can be taught much more cheaply to one’s own apprentices than 
to postapprentices trained elsewhere. Second, the role of unions, employer as- 
sociations, and, critically, works councils in the wage bargaining system makes 
it difficult for companies to use wages as a means of poaching postapprentices 
away  from companies at the same technological level. Thus companies are 
limited to hiring those postapprentices who positively prefer not to stay in the 
company in which they were trained or whom that company did not wish to 
retain. A company seeking to hire postapprentices trained elsewhere therefore 
runs a considerable risk: if the quit rate is low, the likelihood is high that the 
company will end up hiring postapprentices whom their training company did 
not wish to retain. We identify an equilibrium with a low quit rate (high reten- 
tion rate of postapprentices) and a high percentage of companies with appren- 
ticeship schemes. In this equilibrium, it pays postapprentices not to quit, be- 
cause the likelihood of securing a good position elsewhere is low, and it pays 
companies to train their own apprentices, because the likelihood is high that a 
postapprentice hired elsewhere was not wanted by his training company. (This 
equilibrium takes as given the investment by apprentices. This is explained in 
section 1.4, and enables us to sketch out a full equilibrium in section 1.5.) 
1.2.1  Product Market Strategies and Skill Requirements 
The first part of our explanation of why companies are prepared to provide 
and pay the costs of high-quality apprenticeships is that they have a high de- 
mand for long-tenure employees with general, as well as company-specific, 
skills. Why is this the case? The direct answer lies in the product market strate- 
gies and consequent patterns of work organization which companies pursue. 
Medium-sized and larger German companies aim at product market segments 
for high-quality goods and services-segments-in  which product modifica- 
tion,  customization,  multiple  options, and batch  production  are  important. 
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competition, where companies supply companies facing international compe- 
tition, or where-as  in retail banking-international  competition is potential. 
German strength has tended to be less in what the OECD classifies as high- 
technology sectors (e.g., telecommunications and semiconductors) than in the 
application of  modern  technology to “medium-technology’’  sectors, notably 
machinery and engineering as well as textiles and retail banking. 
Successful performance  in  these  markets  requires  flexible  teamwork  re- 
sponses to changing product specifications on the part of manual and low-level 
nonmanual employees, and on the part of management. It requires individual 
workers to have the necessary  understanding to operate, program, and some- 
times  maintain  complex  machinery  and requires  white-collar  employees  to 
have a range  of  skills, including computing and appropriate financial  tech- 
niques. Thus general skills-for  instance, in engineering, electronics, and fi- 
nance-are  required.  And  company-specific  skills-for  instance, knowing 
how production scheduling and product modification operates organizationally 
in the company-are  required, as well. Behind both is a suitably high level of 
academic competence, in terms of numeracy and 1itera~y.l~ 
By no means all manual or lower-level white-collar employees in medium- 
sized and larger companies are skilled to this extent: semiskilled workers may 
constitute a third or even a half of the work force, and we will see in the next 
section how they are often trained. The point here is that a substantial propor- 
tion of the work force needs to be skilled, in the ways described, in order to 
enable companies to be successful in markets, for high-quality goods. 
It will be equally evident that companies will want to keep these skilled 
workers  as long as possible,  since their skills will improve with practice in 
teamwork and product modification. Thus, given their product market strate- 
gies,  companies  will  want  to establish  internal  labor  markets  in  which  a 
substantial proportion  of  employees have general skills. This system of  pro- 
duction, with its link between high-quality product market strategies and skill- 
based work organization with internal flexibility, has been analyzed by Streeck 
as diversified quality production (Sorge and Streeck 1988). 
Why do larger, medium-sized, and many small German companies choose 
this type of  product (or service) market, and related work organization, strat- 
egy, at least if they are in broad market areas in which this strategy is feasible? 
To understand why this is so, it is important to examine the role played by 
infrastructural institutions in Germany and the framework incentive structures 
they set up for companies. There are three elements in the argument. 
Rules on Firing and Wage-Cutting 
It is difficulty for companies to adopt either a low-wage employment strat- 
egy or one which relies on flexible use of the external labor market to adjust 
13. A number of studies carried out by industrial sociologists confirm this view of work organi- 
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the size and skill composition of their work forces. A low-wage employment 
strategy is ruled out by  the system of  wage determinati~n.’~  Collective bar- 
gaining over wages is conducted between employer associations and unions at 
the industry level. These industry agreements on basic wages are de facto, and 
usually de jure, binding on employers. They may  be supplemented by  non- 
legally binding agreements at the company level, between the company and 
the works council: the latter is composed of and elected by  employees and, 
while formally independent, usually has close ties with the industry union. 
Thus, as long as a company operates in Germany it cannot resort to low wages. 
In addition, achieving labor-cost flexibility by frequent use of redundancies is 
subject to institutional constraints. Works councils are given considerable legal 
powers to delay redundancies or to impose significant costs on employers in 
their event. In particular, management must, by law, agree to a “social plan” 
with the works council-specifying  compensation, retraining plans, and pos- 
sible relocation, for those made redundant (see Streeck 1984). The chairs of 
works councils in the larger companies have considerable access to company 
deliberations and information; in practice an implicit long-term understanding 
usually exists that as long as the works council chair is satisfied that the com- 
pany is doing its best to maintain and develop markets through product devel- 
opment and  that  the company  attaches  high  priority  to retraining  existing 
skilled employees, the works council chair will allow necessary redundancies. 
Companies  thus  have  flexibility-if,  for  instance,  markets  collapse-but 
within the constraints of  pursuing a product-oriented  market strategy and a 
skilled labor force strategy. 
Institutional Provision of Cooperation and a Skilled, Educated Work Force 
In many countries the personnel strategy envisaged by  diversified quality 
production would be difficult to pursue. It requires cooperative work among 
employees with both marketable and company-specific skills, with consider- 
able employment security, and with a mode of work organization that is diffi- 
cult to monitor; it also requires suitable numbers of  skilled workers. In the 
United Kingdom and the United States, the proportion of well-educated and 
skilled lower-level workers is relatively low, and there are no institutional guar- 
antees of cooperative behavior. Hence, in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, such requirements are usually met only .by companies prepared to pay 
efficiency wages sufficiently over the odds, to attract skilled lower-level work- 
ers and to ensure that these workers will not risk, by uncooperative behavior, 
redundancy and lower wages elsewhere. 
In  Germany, by  contrast,  the  individual  company  has  access  to  well- 
educated and skilled lower-level employees, either by hiring them in the exter- 
nal labor market or by training them itself. (Of course, we have to explain in 
14. For a detailed discussion of  wage determination in Germany, see Flanagan, Soskice, and 
Ulman (1983) and Soskice (I  990). 40  David Soskice 
this section why enough companies undertake apprenticeship training for this 
to be the case; here all that is argued is that a skilled work force strategy is 
easy for the German companies to pursue, in terms of availability of skilled or 
trainable well-educated  lower-level workers.) In addition, companies are de 
facto guaranteed a cooperative work force by the industrial relations system. 
These guarantees, especially in larger companies, come from the works coun- 
cil and are reinforced by the industrial union. How? The works council, close 
to the work force, can monitor behavior better than management can; more- 
over, it can sanction individual employees, as it is involved in almost all lower- 
level personnel decisions. Its incentive to ensure cooperative behavior is that 
it can bargain for work-force benefits from management, based on improved 
employee performance; the greater these benefits, the more secure its reelec- 
tion possibilities. 
The Financial System and the Provision of Long-Term Finance 
Despite these institutional constraints and incentives, it is difficult, without 
being able to rely on a long-term financial framework, for companies to pursue 
product  and  labor market  strategies which  involve long-term  commitment. 
Both large German companies and smaller ones have such a framework avail- 
able, though in different ways. The German system of corporate governance of 
publicly quoted companies gives management security from hostile takeovers: 
a successful takeover requires 75 percent of  the voting shares, and the high 
degree of  coordination among the main German financial institutions, espe- 
cially among the largest banks, almost always enables them to form an obstruc- 
tive 25 percent minority. In fact, hardly any hostile takeovers succeeded in the 
past decade. In return for such security, the large financial institutions have 
access to company decision making and information, and they may intervene 
if  they believe top management  is inefficient or is following seriously mis- 
taken policies. 
Companies face institutional constraints and incentives conducive to inter- 
nal labor market strategies, in which a significant proportion of the work force 
has marketable skills. Do companies have an incentive to invest in training in 
marketable skills themselves, or should they seek to hire them? The next two 
sections look at the cost to companies of apprenticeship training, and the last 
at the costs of hiring on the external labor market. 
1.2.2  The Net Cost of Apprenticeship Training 
We have already seen in table 1.3 (col. [6] on net costs) that large companies 
pay significant net costs for each apprentice-year. From an international com- 
parative  perspective,  however, there  is  another  question.  What  would  an 
apprenticeship cost if other agents (apprentices themselves, employer associa- 
tions and chambers, the public sector, works councils and unions, etc.) made 
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In this section, we consider two contributors: apprentices and employer associ- 
ations and chambers. Their contributions, financial and nonfinancial, are cen- 
tral in reducing the gross costs to a manageable level. 
Investment by Apprentices: Low Apprentice Pay and Educational Effort 
The cost to companies of  training is low, first, because of  the investment 
which apprentices themselves make in education and training. Why appren- 
tices make these investments is the subject of  section 1.4. Here, we ask how 
much these investments reduce the costs of training. The investments are of 
two sorts. Directly, apprentices accept low earnings during their apprentice- 
ships. To  properly measure this investment, apprentice pay needs to be com- 
pared  with the pay of  an unskilled  worker of  that age. Appropriate  figures 
for full-time unskilled earnings for competent 16-20-year-olds are not readily 
available, since there is virtually no market for such workers; the figures gener- 
ally quoted are for skilled earnings in the occupation in question. However, 
compare the  1984-85  progression of  wages with  experience in auto repair 
shops (part of the handwerk sector) 
first-year apprentice-DM  400 per month, 
second-year apprentice-DM  423 per month, 
third-year apprentice-DM  477 per month, 
lowest wage-grade worker-DM  1,728 per month, and 
skilled worker-DM  2,446, 
with the progression in industry 
unskilled worker-DM  2,009 per month, 
semiskilled worker (metals)-DM  2,856 per month, 
skilled worker (metals)-DM  3,312 per month, 
Meister-DM  3,853 per month, and 
Obemzeister-DM  4.980. 
Unskilled earnings are three to four times the apprentice wage (Streek et al. 
1987, table 5; calculations based on Prais and Wagner 1988,47). 
Indirectly, apprentices invest effort in schoolwork prior to getting an appren- 
ticeship; the evidence for this is indirect: all that needs to be  noted is that 
Germans in the bottom  50 percent of the ability distribution at age 16 (the 
modal age at which young people move from school into an apprenticeship) 
score significantly higher on standardized tests than do the corresponding chil- 
dren in the United  Kingdom.  Moreover an increasing proportion  of  young 
people are completing an Abitur before seeking an apprenticeship, and some 
of the best apprenticeships, such as those in banking, are now making the Abi- 
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The Contribution of Employer Associations and Chambers and 
Works Councils 
Any high-quality apprenticeship scheme has significant costs for most com- 
panies, in terms of advice and supervision at the setting-up and of monitoring 
during operation. There are two elements in these costs. The first is direct: the 
cost of advice and consultancy. In the German system, such advice is available 
from local chambers and industrial employer associations, which can rely on 
their own research institutes and on a wealth of experience with the many prob- 
lems involved in the initiation and operation of training schemes. In addition, 
the works council plays an important role in helping the company to operate 
an apprenticeship scheme. The works council, in turn, has its own access to 
advice from the industry union, which also conducts its own research-often 
in close collaboration with the employer association-and  accumulates experi- 
ence from advising on different situations. 
The second cost is nonjinancial, but of central importance: For most compa- 
nies (though perhaps not for the very largest) the provision  of high-quality 
in-company training requires external advice and monitoring. For an external 
system of advice and monitoring to be effective, the external institutions must 
have full access to the company. In general, companies are wary of  allowing 
such access, particularly if the external agencies belong to or are responsible 
to the public sector. Agencies can only be trusted  not to misuse information 
they gain from the company if their incentive structure makes misuse highly 
unlikely.  Public  training  advisory  agencies  seldom  have  such  an  incentive 
structure, since their paymaster is the government. Employer associations and 
chambers, on the other hand, at least as they operate in Germany, are consid- 
ered trustworthy, presumably because they are under the collective control of 
companies  in the  sector or region.  (An interesting contrast is with  France, 
where attempts to develop in-company training are led by the state, and where 
businesses are suspicious of chambers for fear they are more creatures of the 
state than representatives  of industry.) We  shall see how powerful  business 
associations play  many  other important roles in the German apprenticeship 
system: here, we stress the importance of their being trustworthy external bod- 
ies with whom companies can deal closely, thus minimizing the nonfinancial- 
or what might be called the “distrust” transactions-costs  for companies, from 
external-agency advice and monitoring within the company. 
A point complementary to this involves the relation of the company to the 
union and the works council. As with business associations, the role played by 
works councils and unions in the effective operation of the German apprentice- 
ship system is of great importance and will be discussed in different contexts 
in the rest of this paper. At this point, we note the low distrust transactions 
costs to companies,  arising  from the  advice  about  and  monitoring  of  in- 
company training by unions and works councils. These activities complement 
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nies. They are necessary to guarantee to apprentices the quality and market- 
ability of  their training. The low  distrust is a consequence of  the generally 
close and high-trust relations between company management and the works 
council and of the fact that most of the monitoring is carried out by the works 
council rather than by the union. The union gives advice and research support 
to the works council. Companies are more suspicious of external unions than 
of  their own works councils. Even so, unions are usually seen as partners in 
improving international competitiveness, and their direct involvement in com- 
pany training questions, when it occurs, it not as threatening as it would be 
perceived to be in the United Kingdom or France. 
1.2.3  The Probability That Companies Will Keep Apprentices after Training 
What guarantee does a company have that its apprentices will remain after 
their apprenticeships are completed? It can be seen statistically that this reten- 
tion rate varies with company size. In this section we are concerned only with 
medium-sized and large companies; small companies, with low or negative net 
apprenticeship costs and relatively low retention rates, are analyzed in the next 
section. In medium-sized and large companies, the retention rate is consider- 
ably higher on average. As can be seen in table 1.4, in large companies the 
retention rate is between 80 and 90 percent, with some decline with the size of 
the company. 
There are two separate components in the retention rate, which need to be 
distinguished. The first is that a company may not want to retain some appren- 
tices, who have successfully completed their apprenticeships but whose suit- 
ability for its internal labor market the company doubts. The company has two 
reasons to minimize the number of  such “nonretentions.” Most obviously, it 
loses the net costs of  the apprenticeship. In addition, its apprenticeships be- 
come less attractive to potential apprentices, since access to the company’s 
internal labor market seems less likely. Thus the average quality of  the school- 
leavers it can attract declines. For both reasons, the company has a strong in- 
centive to use the initial choice of apprentices as its key screening period; at 
that stage, companies subject candidates to interviews and written tests and 
take school performance very seriously. There is also an initial probationary 
period of  one to three months, during which  some further screening takes 
place. Nonretention at the end of  the apprenticeship is therefore only a last 
resort. 
The second element in nonretention is the decision by the newly graduated 
skilled worker to leave the company and seek employment elsewhere. Such a 
decision depends on the attractiveness of the offers which alternative compa- 
nies might make. We  will argue in the next section that the system of  wage 
determination makes it difficult for other companies to use wage incentives to 
pull skilled workers away from similar companies. This means that apprentices 
accepting a position in a similar company will not gain higher wages. If, in 
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internal labor markets and that moving entails uncertainty and other costs, then 
postapprentices will not move. 
If moving costs were positive for all postapprentices, the voluntary postap- 
prenticeship quit rate would be zero according to the assumptions made so far. 
However, some postapprentices would like to move, for example because of 
family or locational reasons or perhaps because of  some particular disadvan- 
tage they see in the training company, so that the positive moving cost assump- 
tion does not apply. Whether these postapprentices move will depend on the 
likelihood that they will find positions in other companies. If it is very likely, 
then most will try to move; if it is unlikely, most will not. Thus the quit rate is 
not exogenous but depends on the extent to which other comparable companies 
do not train apprentices or do not train enough to meet their internal labor 
market needs. If we call the quit rate q and the proportion of companies which 
train apprentices t, then (loosely) q =  q(t),  with qt < 0: the higher the propor- 
tion of training companies the lower the rate of postapprentices. 
Now we can put this together with the rate of ineffective postapprentices,  1 
(for “lemon”), where I is assumed to be exogenous and small for the purpose 
of this discussion. Thus the retention rate r cannot be determined exogenously: 
since r = 1 -  1 + q(t),  the retention rate is determined in equilibrium with t. 
In conclusion, we have seen why the retention rate of  medium-sized  and 
large companies is high. First, companies do not use the apprenticeship as a 
major screening device. Second, as long as postapprentices face positive mov- 
ing costs, the postapprenticeship quit rate will be kept low between companies 
with similarly attractive internal labor markets, because nontraining companies 
are limited in their ability to use wage strategies to induce postapprentices 
to transfer. However, when we include the possibility that some proportion 
of postapprentices may want to move, the quite rate of postapprentices  and 
hence the retention rate of postapprentices by their training companies depend 
endogenously on decisions of companies to train or to hire already trained 
workers. We  now turn therefore to decisions by  companies to hire workers 
trained elsewhere. 
1.2.4  The Costs of Hiring Previously Trained Skilled Workers 
Given that companies need skilled workers who have served an apprentice- 
ship, an alternative strategy to training apprentices in-house is to hire skilled 
workers who have served their apprenticeships elsewhere. As we have already 
mentioned, there may be circumstances in which companies follow this strat- 
egy: for instance in setting up a greenfield plant in a new area (as may be the 
case with incoming multinationals) or in the face of rapid expansion. Moreover 
there may be informal arrangements between some large companies and de- 
pendent companies whereby the large companies overtrain and then distribute 
trained workers (not the best ones) to these dependents. In these cases the logic 
is usually clear. But in general the great majority of larger companies do their 
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of training apprentices, this suggests there is a significant loss in hiring workers 
trained elsewhere, if companies are maximizing profits as we assume. Such a 
loss arises partly because of  the cost of  training in company-specific skills. 
It also arises for two conjoint reasons related to the constraints of  the wage 
determination system and to the use of apprenticeships to screen out those who 
are inappropriate, which may lead companies to believe that, by hiring those 
trained elsewhere, they do not have access to the best young workers. 
The Relative Costs of Company-spec@  Training during Apprenticeships 
and Subsequently 
As suggested earlier in this section, company-specific skills are important 
in medium-sized and larger German enterprises, accounting for the role played 
by internal labor markets. There are at least three reasons it is cheaper to impart 
these skills during an  apprenticeship, rather than  later on hiring a  skilled 
worker trained elsewhere. First, company-specific skills-such  as procedural 
and organizational knowledge, production scheduling, working with particular 
machines or performing particular operations-can  usually be taught at little 
cost during the apprenticeship, since the skills which must be taught can be 
taught within a company framework; the additional resources devoted to such 
instruction are likely to be small. Second, company-specific skills acquired 
during an apprenticeship will be taught to low-paid apprentices rather than to 
workers paid a skilled worker’s salary. And third, company-specific skills are 
complementary to general skills in modern technological environments which 
require teamwork. 
We  have been unable to locate any research on the cost or length of time 
taken to impart adequate company-specific skills to a newly hired skilled em- 
ployee. Nor is there data on the difference between the starting wage of a post- 
apprentice with in-house training and that of a postapprentice hired after train- 
ing in  another company. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the 
order of  magnitude of  the cost is substantial. Assume that it takes a newly 
hired skilled worker one to two years to be fully conversant with machines, 
procedures, teams, and so forth. The annual labor cost to a company of  a 
skilled worker, in the year covered by the apprenticeship-cost survey (1980), is 
around DM 45,000; these companies typically sell differentiated products and 
do not operate in perfectly competitive markets, so the marginal revenue prod- 
uct of the worker will be higher, say DM 60,000 (reflecting a price elasticity 
of demand of  one-third). Thus, over 18 months the net contribution to profits 
of a skilled worker with fully effective company-specific skills would be of the 
order of  DM 90,000. In a complex teamwork environment, the effectiveness 
of a skilled worker without the appropriate company-specific skills is low, be- 
cause the company-specific skills are complementary to general skills. As- 
sume, in consequence, the worker is 50 percent effective over 18 months: then 
the cost of  acquiring the company-specific skills is DM 45,000 (leaving dis- 
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merits careful research, which has not been undertaken (as far as we are aware) 
in  Germany.  What  the  example  is  designed  to  show  is  that,  if  complex 
company-specific  skills are important  and complementary  in  production  to 
marketable skills and if  they can be taught at low cost in an apprenticeship 
program, then these will be important elements in the costs of hiring externally 
as opposed to training internally. The example suggests that this cost may be 
of the same order of magnitude as the net costs of an apprenticeship. 
The Constraints of the Wage Determination System 
The first constraint is that it is difficult for companies to use wage strategies 
to poach skilled labor from other companies. Wages in Germany are deter- 
mined at two levels: Industry negotiations (technically by region) between the 
industry union and the industry employer association set basic pay levels for 
different classes of workers. These are (generally) de facto binding on all com- 
panies within the industry. Subsequent negotiations at the company level, be- 
tween management  and the works  council, add a supplement which can in 
principle be flexible across groups of employees. These settlements are care- 
fully  monitored  by  both  employer  association  and  union,  to prevent  leap- 
frogging pressures, while allowing within-company flexibility in developing 
internal wage structures. These internal wage structures are shaped by manage- 
ment, but the works council plays an important role in larger companies. It is 
not in the interest of the works council for these wage structures to be used to 
entice skilled labor from other companies (except in special circumstances, as 
mentioned above), because such practice undercuts the bargaining ability of 
the council-in  particular its ability to pressure management to retrain existing 
skilled workers whenever possible. Nor is it in the interest of the works council 
to substitute skilled workers  trained  elsewhere for in-house apprentices: the 
legal role of the works council in apprenticeship training enables it to ensure 
the quality of future skilled workers in the company and to recruit apprentices 
to the union. Moreover, even if the works council were prepared to allow man- 
agement to behave in this way,  it could obtain approval from the employees 
(who elect the council) only if existing skilled workers shared the higher wages 
paid by  management to attract new recruits; this would greatly add to the cost 
of such a strategy. Thus it would be difficult for management to develop wage 
strategies to enable it to bid for those who had just completed their apprentice- 
ships elsewhere. 
The Adverse Selection Problem 
Companies are at liberty to advertise for skilled labor, subject to the type of 
informal constraints on wage strategies just discussed. There are active occupa- 
tional labor markets, and young people who have just completed their appren- 
ticeships are at liberty to move. But there are strong asymmetric information 
arguments which contribute to restraining both sides at the immediate postap- 
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As noted in subsection 1.2.3, in discussing the retention rates of companies, 
companies are not likely to retain postapprentices who for one reason or an- 
other are “difficult.” These nonretained postapprentices may present screening 
difficulties for a company seeking to hire postapprentices in the market: they 
will have passed their examinations, and moreover, at the stage at which they 
were given apprenticeships, they passed whatever academic or other tests the 
training company used for selection. Thus, companies who do not train their 
own apprentices but instead attempt to hire those trained elsewhere will have 
a  higher-than-average  probability of  ending  up  with  less-effective skilled 
workers. How much higher that probability is, depends on the proportion of 
postapprentices who quit voluntarily. The smaller the proportion who quit, the 
larger the probability that hiring postapprentices trained elsewhere will result 
in acquiring “lemons.” Thus the “lemon” probability is endogenous; we need 
to put the last three subsections together to get a picture of what an equilibrium 
might look like. 
1.2.5  A High-Retention, High-Training Equilibrium 
We  know statistically that the percentage of training companies, t, is high 
for medium-sized and large companies; that the retention rate I; is high (see 
table 1.4); and that therefore the quit rate, q, is correspondingly low. Is this 
consistent with equilibrium behavior by companies and postapprentices, given 
that the net cost of apprenticeship training is positive? 
Intuitively, characterizing the equilibrium is simple. If  companies believe 
the quit rate will be low and thus their retention of postapprentices high, the 
postapprentices on the market are likely to be those that their training compa- 
nies did not want to keep. Thus companies would correctly believe that hiring 
postapprentices trained elsewhere is likely to obtain ineffective workers. Will 
the implicit cost of  ineffective workers plus  the  cost of  training them  in 
company-specific skills outweigh the cost of apprenticeships? We have already 
seen that the cost of training in company-specific skills may be considerable. 
A ballpark figure is DM 45,000 (see subsection 1.2.4). The net cost of meeting 
internal labor market needs through apprenticeships has two components: the 
net cost per apprentice, between DM 10,000 and DM 20,000 per annum for 
3.5 years, comes out reasonably close to the cost of  subsequent training in 
company-specific skills; in  addition, a  larger  number of  apprentices than 
needed must be trained, because not all apprentices will be retained, so the net 
cost needs to be multiplied by the inverse of the retention rate. If the retention 
rate is high (80 to 100 percent), this addition to net costs is low, of the order of 
15 percent. Thus it is clear that, if companies are at all worried about the qual- 
ity of postapprentices available on the market, compared to those they can hire 
at the apprenticeship entry stage, it makes sense to train apprentices. The cost 
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company-specific training of  postapprentices trained elsewhere, but they are 
of  the same order of  magnitude-and  to the company-specific training cost 
must be added the cost of “lemons.” So, if companies believe the retention rate 
is high, it probably pays most companies to train apprentices. 
If most companies train, postapprentices will be unlikely to quit, since they 
will be unlikely to receive offers elsewhere. With a low quit rate, the retention 
rate will be high, and thus the behavior of companies and postapprentices will 
be in equilibrium. This does not imply that this high-retention, high-training 
equilibrium is the only one. It may well be that there is a low-retention, low- 
training equilibrium as well. This can be shown in a simple game theoretic 
framework. 
Companies have two choices in this model, to train apprentices (train) or to 
hire already trained postapprentices (hire). Companies choose to train if the 
cost of training enough apprentices to meet internal labor market needs is less 
than the cost of hiring. The net cost of an apprentice, whether or not the appren- 
tice stays with the company, is p.  If the retention rate is I;  the cost of training 
an apprentice who stays with the company is plr.  The rate r is inversely related 
to q, since r = 1 -1 -  q. Hence, in terms of the quit rate, the cost of a retained 
apprentice  is Pl(1 -  1 - q). The cost of  hiring  is the cost  of  training  in 
company-specific skills, c‘, plus the cost of  hiring  a “lemon,” c‘, where the 
latter  is positively related  to the ratio of  “lemons”  to  total  postapprentice 
leavers: c‘ + c’(U(1 + 4)). If the q is high, assume that 
c”/(l -  1 -  q) >  cs + c’(Zl(1 + 9)); 
if q is low, assume the inequality is reversed, since most postapprentices will 
be retained and there is therefore a high probability of hiring a “lemon.” 
Postapprentices can choose to quit or to stay (as long as they are not “lem- 
ons”). This choice depends on the range of alternatives: these may be signifi- 
cant if few companies train, and hence many seek to acquire skilled workers; 
they are insignificant if most companies do their own training. Call the benefit 
of staying with the training company B”, and that of leaving B’  if the probability 
of finding the most preferred alternative externally is unity, pr, = 1. Thus the 
payoff to leaving is B’  * pi,, where pr, depends on the proportion of companies 
which fill their internal labor markets by training, Tr 
In table 1.5, the choices {Stay, Train) correspond to the German situation: 
Table 1.5  Apprentice Training Game 
Companies 
Postapprentices  Train  Hire 
Stay 
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our interest is in seeing under what conditions this is a Nash equilibrium. The 
first condition for this equilibrium is 
B”  >  B”  .pr,(Tr). 
This says that postapprentices will choose to stay, as long as the benefits of 
staying outweigh the benefits of a low probability-since  most companies will 
meet their skill needs through their own training-of  finding the most pre- 
ferred job elsewhere. The second condition is 
cVr(q*> <  cs + c’, 
where r(q*)  is the retention ratio if quits are low, and so is close to unity. This 
says that companies will choose to train, as long as the costs of apprenticeship 
training are less than subsequent company-specific  training costs plus “lemon” 
costs: because most postapprentices choose not to quit, the “lemon” risk is 
high. 
As  long as B”  > B’  - pre(H),  where H  = 1 - TK this “high-skill, high- 
training” equilibrium is the only one. If the inequality is reversed, then {Quit, 
Hire} will also be a “low-skill, low-training’’ equilibrium. 
The purpose of this section is simply to say that it makes sense that the large 
majority of  medium-sized and large companies are prepared to spend money 
on training apprentices; it can be justified as an equilibrium, albeit one depen- 
dent-as  we have seen in this section-on  infrastructural institutions. There 
is a second caveat: the equilibrium here is partial; notably, it takes for granted 
that schoolchildren and apprentices are prepared to invest in apprenticeships 
through educational performance and low apprentice wages. This is major fac- 
tor in keeping apprenticeship costs low. In section 1.4, we will see how the 
apprenticeship system sets up incentives for young people and will examine 
the “general” equilibrium in which companies run apprenticeships because the 
educational performance of young people is high and young people invest in 
education because of the apprenticeship system. 
1.3  Training in the Handwerk Sector 
Apprenticeship training in small companies in the handwerk sector (e.g., as 
garage mechanics, bakers, electricians, plumbers, painters, hairdressers) oper- 
ates in ways broadly similar to those in the medium-sized and larger companies 
discussed in section 1.2. That is to say, the apprenticeship program is carefully 
structured; there are external examinations at the end, with resulting certifica- 
tion for successful candidates; and the dual system allows the more theoretical 
work to be learned in public vocational schools. While these apprenticeships 
are-in  a sense to be noted-at  a lower level than those discussed in section 
1.2, there is no evidence whatsoever that they are artificial and simply a source 
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There are however major differences, at least on average, between the two 
sectors. These differences make it difficult to use the arguments of section 1.2 
to explain why small companies train. Before setting out these difficulties, the 
differences can be summarized as follows: The retention rate of postappren- 
tices is lower than in larger companies (table 1.4), 64 percent in companies 
with 10-49  employees versus 87 percent in companies with more than 1,000 
employees. The percentage of companies which run apprenticeship programs 
is lower, 59 percent versus 99 percent (table 1.4). The annual net cost of ap- 
prenticeships is lower, DM 7,248 in the handwerk sector versus DM  14,310 
among companies with more than  1,000 employees (table  1.3). The educa- 
tional background of  apprentices is weaker: in the handwerk sector in 1989, 
5.4 percent had no school-leaving certificate, 55.0 percent had a Huuprschule- 
leaving certificate, 18.6 percent had a Realschule-leaving certificate, and 5.3 
percent had an Abitur; this compares with 0.8, 27.9, 35.3, and 19.2 percent, 
respectively, in the industrialkommercial sector (BMBW 1991, 36). The pro- 
portion of the training time spent on the job is high (Munch 1991). 
These differences are, of course, average differences. In reality, the contrast 
between the two sectors is less sharp than that which will be drawn in this 
paper:  many small advanced  companies, classified in the  handwerk  sector, 
train in the same way as larger companies; some larger companies, especially 
in retailing, follow practices closer, on average, to those of small companies: 
and there is a big spread within some larger companies in  the level of their 
apprenticeships. That said, the major gross differences make it useful to con- 
struct, in effect, a two-sector model. The need to do so becomes apparent when 
we see that it is difficult to explain, using the same arguments as for larger 
companies, why companies in the handwerk sector train. 
Let us assume that, as for larger companies, small companies have a demand 
for skilled labor and can choose between training apprentices and hiring post- 
apprentices trained elsewhere, to satisfy that demand. Large companies choose 
to train apprentices, it was argued, because they can count on a high retention 
rate and because the cost of  imparting company-specific skills at the postap- 
prentice stage to those trained elsewhere is high. It is difficult to understand 
on this basis why small companies are prepared to invest in training appren- 
tices. First, their retention rate is significantly lower. Taking the net cost of 
training of DM 7,248 per annum per apprentice and dividing this by the reten- 
tion rate for companies with 10-49  employees, to get a rough idea of the net 
cost per annum to produce a “retained” postapprentice in the handwerk sector, 
we get a figure of DM 11,325 per annum; this compares to the net cost per 
annum of a “retained” postapprentice in larger companies of DM 16,448 per 
annum (i.e.,  14, 310/.87). Large companies are prepared to bear these costs 
because of the cost of hiring postapprentices trained elsewhere: the “lemon” 
problem and the cost of  company-specific training. But for small companies 
the “lemon” problem is unimportant, since the quit rate for small companies is 
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for small companies, the net cost of training apprentices is likely to be greater 
than the cost of hiring already trained skilled workers. 
The majority of small companies do not train apprentices. But why do those 
who do train do so? There are a number of possible hypotheses: On the as- 
sumption that these companies are interested in maximizing profits, it may be 
that they are acting so as to avoid implicit sanctions. This cannot be ruled out 
for certain sectors, but as a general explanation it suffers from the fact that 
the majority of small companies choose not to train. We focus therefore on 
investigating why profit-maximizing companies might choose to train appren- 
tices in the absence of implicit sanctions. 
We have already noted that the “net cost” figures must be treated with some 
caution. We now explain how they were calculated and why this method of 
calculation is likely to exaggerate the net cost for small companies but not for 
large ones. The three main components of the net cost of apprenticeships are 
(i) the cost of the apprentice’s wages and associated expenditures, (ii) the cost 
of wages and associated expenditures of company employees involved in train- 
ing, multiplied by the fraction of their working time devoted to training, and 
(iii) the estimated value of the apprentice’s contribution to the net output of the 
company. Of these three components, only (i) is straightforward to measure; 
the method of calculating (ii) and (iii), we will argue, makes sense for larger 
companies but not for small ones. 
Appropriate calculations should measure the net marginal cost, ((i) and (ii)), 
or revenue, (iii), of an apprentice to the company during the apprenticeship. 
Item (i) measures marginal and average costs, so there is no problem. But the 
measure of (ii) is the average cost, i.e., the total cost of the employee engaged 
in training multiplied by the proportion of his or her time occupied in training. 
In small companies, training is on the job: the main trainer, the meistel; is also 
the supervisor of other employees. The trainerhupervisor in a small company 
can switch between  these functions at low cost; generally, companies have 
busy and less busy periods, and the trainer/supervisor  might be expected to 
divide his or her time so as to minimize the cost of training to the company. 
An example is hairdressing: when a salon is busy, the trainer/supervisor will 
be attending clients; when it is less busy, he will be training an apprentice. 
Thus, insofar as the cost of switching activities is low for the trainer and as the 
pattern of demand has slack and busy periods, the marginal cost of  the trainer 
may be quite low. By contrast, in a larger company, much of the training takes 
place off the job; with a larger number of apprentices, the cost of switching 
and rearranging activities is higher for the trainer/supervisor. 
The method of calculating the contribution of  the apprentice to the net out- 
put of the company, (iii), underestimates the marginal revenue of the apprentice 
in a small company. The contribution of the apprentice is calculated by taking 
the length of time taken by an apprentice to do a range of skilled operations as 
a multiple of the length of time taken by a skilled worker. The contribution of 
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worker, divided by this multiple, multiplied by the fraction of the apprentice’s 
time on the job. In larger companies, this may be a reasonable approximation: 
the apprentice may spend a relatively small amount of time on the job, and on- 
the-job work may be carefully structured so that the apprentice learns skilled 
operations. But in small companies, the apprentice will typically do a mixture 
of unskilled  and  semiskilled  work, as well  as slulled work. Moreover, the 
skilled work can be done when it is most convenient for the company: learning 
to use machinery, for example, during a slack period. For a small company, the 
choice may be between hiring an unskilled worker and taking on an apprentice; 
the apprentice is fully capable of doing unskilled work, and as the apprentice- 
ship progresses, she becomes capable of doing an increasing range of  skilled 
and unskilled work. Thus, in a cost-minimizing environment, training takes 
place during slack periods; during busy times the apprentice works on un- 
skilled, on semiskilled, and, increasingly, on those skilled tasks which the ap- 
prentice has learnt to do effectively. It may therefore may be more appropriate 
to value the apprentice’s contribution as somewhere near that of an unskilled 
worker (multiplied by the proportion of the apprentice’s time spent on the job). 
We have been unable to find any case studies which would enable us to make 
precise corrections to the net cost figures along the lines suggested above. If 
we take these adjustments at nearly face value, we come up with calculations 
suggesting that handwerk apprenticeships do not have a net cost to the com- 
pany: for instance, if  an apprentice’s contribution to output is valued at half 
that of the labor cost of an unskilled worker, it is of the order of magnitude of 
DM 15,000 per annum. This brings the net cost to zero. If in addition, the cost 
of the training personnel (DM 7,605 per annum) is halved, there is a net profit 
of over DM 3,500 per annum. 
To  conclude the argument of this section: It is difficult to understand why 
profit-maximizing handwerk companies should be prepared to take losses on 
apprenticeships, given the low retention rate of postapprentices. However, the 
figures which suggest that there is a net cost in this sector are calculated by a 
method which makes little sense for small companies. We do not have the data 
necessary to make proper adjustments to these figures: but the adjustments 
made in the last paragraph by way of example suggest that the more plausible 
hypothesis for handwerk companies is that apprenticeships do not lead to net 
losses. If this is correct, it explains why handwerk companies are prepared to 
take apprentices despite the high quit rate. 
1.4  Why Young People Invest in Education and Training 
Young Germans who do not go on to higher education invest in apprentice- 
ships in two ways: Explicitly, they accept low wages during the apprenticeship, 
implicitly, they invest in academic performance at school. These investments 
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investments? The apprenticeship system provides a strong and clear set of in- 
centives. 
1.4.1 
The apprenticeship, outside the handwerk sector, is the main port of entry 
to an internal skilled labor market in a company. It is thus the main route to 
skilled work. This carries with it significant wage differentials relative to semi- 
skilled employment. Moreover, it provides secure employment prospects, typi- 
cally with long tenure and a range of additional benefits. Semiskilled workers 
in the same companies are less well protected by  works councils, which are in 
practice dominated by  skilled workers. Further formal advancement requires 
both a skilled worker’s certificate and work experience. Thus an apprenticeship 
is necessary to enter the additional training needed to qualify as a meister 
(supervisorhrainer) or as a technician, and to get analogous qualifications in 
commercial companies. These positions in turn cany higher salaries (see sub- 
section 1.2.2), greater security, and the possibility of further advancement. 
Apprenticeships in the handwerk sector are in general less advantageous. 
But they offer, for children with a lower educational background, better pros- 
pects than  no training. Larger companies recruit their semiskilled workers 
from among such  apprentice^.'^ While semiskilled work in a company is not 
as well-rewarded and secure as skilled work, the semiskilled worker shares 
some of the benefits of the internal labor market. Alternatively, there is employ- 
ment as a skilled worker in the handwerk sector, either in a training company 
or elsewhere. 
1.4.2 
The Main Port of Entry to Internal Labor Markets 
The Skilled Worker’s Certificate as Insurance Policy 
Internal labor markets offer, in general, considerable employment security 
and good working conditions. But neither is absolute: the skilled worker’s cer- 
tificate is insurance against an unsatisfactory internal labor market. If  a skilled 
employee is made redundant, the certificate enables him to obtain alternative 
skilled employment via the external occupational labor market. 
This “insurance” function goes beyond the case of redundancy. In general, 
skilled employees are unlikely to quit an internal labor market. But an em- 
ployee may have other reasons for moving, as family circumstances, which are 
not predictable at the time of apprenticeship. Or, for whatever reason, working 
conditions may not be good in the internal labor market: this may include prob- 
lems with colleagues, meisters, the works council, or the like. The possession 
15. We have not discussed why larger companies hire skilled handwerk postapprentices for their 
semiskilled work forces, as opposed to training them themselves, and we have not discovered any 
research on the relative costs. It is not difficult to believe, however, that the training which larger 
companies want their semiskilled workers to have had involves personal work organization, coop- 
erative behavior, and so on, and that this can be taught more effectively in a small company with 
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of a skilled worker’s certificate acts as an insurance policy to guard against 
such eventualities. Either it enables the employee to look for new employment 
without too much loss. Or, because of  this possibility, it gives the employee 
enough power to deal with the situation-for  instance, to complain about ha- 
rassment by  a supervisor without fear that such a complaint will make the 
situation worse. 
1.4.3  The Opportunity Cost: Unskilled Wages and Limited Subsequent 
Possibilities for Apprenticeship Entry 
What  are the  alternatives  to  an  apprenticeship? In  subsection  1.2.2 we 
showed the level of pay for an unskilled worker. This can be compared with 
the pay of a skilled worker (if the potential apprenticeship is in a larger com- 
pany) or with that of a semiskilled worker (if the potential apprenticeship is in 
the handwerk sector). 
This difference underestimates the cost of not having an apprenticeship in 
two ways: first, the security of employment is significantly less for an unskilled 
worker. Second, the apprenticeship system is set up so that it is difficult to 
enter at a later stage. This point is critical; the apprenticeship decision is one 
that is difficult to put off. The selection procedures of companies are geared 
toward choosing apprentices from school-leavers or from those who have spent 
additional time at a full-time vocational school. While it is possible to enter an 
apprenticeship later, it is less likely to be a good one. 
1.4.4  The Incentive to Invest in Educational Performance: Competition for 
Good Apprenticeships 
In order to explain the high level of effort and seriousness attached to aca- 
demic work by those going into apprenticeships, the first point to make is that 
school-leavers have no entitlement to apprenticeships. School-leavers have to 
persuade companies to give them apprenticeships. This depends on interviews, 
school examination performance, the company’s informal contacts with the 
school, and in some large companies, written examinations. In turn, this re- 
flects the competition among companies, noted at the end of section 1.2, to get 
the most able apprentices they can. Thus the general reason the apprenticeship 
system creates an incentive for children to work hard at school is that school 
performance is an important element in gaining an apprenticeship place. 
The incentives to work hard provided by  the apprenticeship selection pro- 
cess are sharply reinforced by differences in the attractiveness of different ap- 
prenticeship schemes. If there were no difference, so that all companies de- 
manded the same level of performance, children above a certain level of ability 
would have no incentive to work harder at school, since without effort they 
could attain the necessary standard; children under a certain (lower) level of 
ability would be unable to reach the standard and therefore would also have no 
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nese schoolchildren, that the ranking of training and internal labor markets in 
Japanese companies, and the care taken by companies to get the best school- 
leavers, gives an incentive to children to work hard at school no matter where 
they are on the age-ability range. This is because at any point on the ability 
range, somewhat better performance will lead to somewhat better company 
placement. It therefore pays schoolchildren of all abilities to work hard and 
seriously at school. While there are formal differences between the school/ 
labor market interfaces in Germany and Japan, the countries are similar in ways 
relevant for Prais’s argument. The contrast is with systems such as the British 
and the American, where improved school performance only marginally im- 
proves employment prospects for non-higher-education  school-leavers. Since 
companies only want semiskilled or unskilled labor at age 16 (or 18) and sel- 
dom offer either prolonged training or internal labor markets, differences in 
employment prospects between companies are much more limited, and the 
incentives to work hard academically are therefore limited for young people 
with little chance of getting into higher education. 
To  summarize this  section, the German apprenticeship  system is one in 
which young people have an incentive to invest by accepting low wages. They 
also have an incentive to work hard at school in order to compete effectively 
for a good apprenticeship, given their underlying ability. 
1.5  Summary and Conclusion 
In section 1.1, we posed three problems for the optimal provision of market- 
able or general training: (1) the classic problem of Becker, that companies have 
no incentive to invest in training, and the related difficulty of young people to 
finance it themselves; (2)  the difficulty of reconciling companies to the intru- 
sion of infrastructural training institutions, necessary for advice, monitoring, 
certification, and diffusion of best practice; and (3)  the problem of providing 
effective incentives for young people, to ensure that they invest sufficiently 
through low apprenticeship wages and prior educational effort, in turn neces- 
sary to keep the costs to companies of apprenticeships sufficiently low. How, 
then, given these problems do we explain an apprenticeship system in which 
companies are under no obligation to run apprenticeship schemes, but the great 
majority of  medium-sized and large companies do, and moreover they make 
significant net investments in them. Young people are under no obligation to 
enter apprenticeships, yet most young people who do not go on to higher edu- 
cation (and even some who do) go into three-and-a-half-year apprenticeships. 
Remarkably, less than 10 percent of each age group go through neither appren- 
ticeship nor higher education, Young people accept low wages during their 
apprenticeships, and they come to the apprenticeship with a high level of prior 
academic performance.  The German system is thus an example of  a “high 
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ketable skills. how  are incentives structured to support such an equilibrium, 
and by whom? We summarize the key points in the argument and finish with 
a brief discussion of the role of institutions. 
1.5.1  Large and Medium-sized Companies 
Almost all of these companies run apprenticeship schemes and incur more 
or less significant net costs during the course of the apprenticeship. The argu- 
ment in section 1.2 as to why they did this had four steps: 
1. The underlying constraints of the industrial-relations systems rule out low 
cost labor strategies and guarantee work force cooperation; the financial sys- 
tem allows companies to operate within a long-run framework. This makes it 
sensible for companies to pursue high-quality and innovative product market 
strategies,  requiring  a work force with high  company-specific  and general 
skills. Companies therefore must either train employees in general skills or 
hire already skilled workers who have been trained elsewhere. 
2. The costs to a company of apprenticeship training, though positive, are 
kept low by  the good education of apprentices and their low apprenticeship 
wages. In addition, the necessary advice about and monitoring of a company’s 
training performance is carried out by  institutions which management gener- 
ally trusts, notably the employer associations and chambers and the employee- 
elected and employee-composed works councils. 
3. The cost  of  training  post  apprentices  trained  elsewhere  in  company- 
specific skills is significantly higher than the cost of  imparting such slulls to 
apprentices. This is because company-specific slulls themselves-particularly 
related to teamwork, production-scheduling, and implementing product modi- 
fication-may  take longer to acquire for someone trained elsewhere to do such 
things differently; apprentice wages are one-third those of a skilled worker, so 
apprentices can be taught more cheaply; and there are economies of  scope 
between the training of general and company-specific skills during an appren- 
ticeship, since the general skills can be imparted within the context of the com- 
pany’s methods of operation. 
4. Finally, if  all other companies train their own apprentices, it pays each 
company to do so as well because of the operation of the wage determination 
system; this system makes it difficult to use individually tailored packages to 
persuade workers to leave comparable companies:  thus the postapprentices 
which a nontraining company will be likely to hire are those whom their train- 
ing companies have chosen not to keep. Hiring these potential “lemons” is a 
costly strategy. 
The conclusion of  this argument is that it will be long-run-profit maximizing 
for companies to train their own apprentices to meet their own internal labor 
market needs for skilled employees. But there is a further conclusion of rele- 
vance: When the company chooses its apprentices, it is choosing the skilled 
members of its internal labor market. Thus the choice is a critical one. The 
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investment which companies put into screening potential apprentices, at this 
stage, in turn structures the incentives for school-children to work effectively 
at school. 
1.5.2  Handwerk-Sector Companies 
Large and medium-sized companies do not, of course, only employ skilled 
workers. Semiskilled employees are also employed, and these companies pre- 
fer to hire such employees after they have completed apprenticeships in small 
companies in the handwerk sector. Why then do handwerk companies run ap- 
prenticeship schemes? Less than half the companies in this sector train. Those 
that do retain only about half of their apprentices at the end of the apprentice- 
ship: a substantial proportion of those leaving go on to semiskilled positions in 
the medium-sized/large-company sector. Therefore, it is difficult to understand 
why companies in the handwerk sector should train apprentices unless they 
can do so at a profit or without sustaining losses during the apprenticeship 
itself. However, the statistics collected at the start of  the  1980s showed an 
apprenticeship to be a net cost in this sector. 
We  argued in section 1.3 that the way  in which net costs were calculated 
was sensible for medium-sized and large companies but exaggerated net costs 
for handwerk-sector companies. This was because small companies, if  con- 
cerned to minimize cost, could often schedule training to occur during slack 
periods and could use apprentices as at least unskilled labor during busy peri- 
ods. Thus the shadow price of the trainer’s time might be very low, as compared 
to the assumption in the statistics that it is the full cost of the trainer during the 
time spent training. And the shadow value of  the apprentice in terms of  net 
output may be estimated at or above that of  an unskilled worker, rather than 
assessed as a proportion of the skills the apprentice can perform. We concluded 
that these statistics should not be taken at their face value for the handwerk 
sector and that a plausible hypothesis is that these companies were behaving 
in a profit-maximizing way. 
1.5.3  Young People and the Competition for Good Apprenticeships 
Young people invest in apprenticeships in two ways: They accept low wages 
during their apprenticeships and they work hard at school to achieve good aca- 
demic performance and good references from their teachers-for  reliability, 
and so forth. In large and medium-sized companies, apprenticeships are attrac- 
tive for the following reasons: 
1. The apprenticeship is almost a necessary condition for skilled employ- 
ment in internal labor markets. These offer considerably better rewards, in- 
cluding  employment  security,  than  semiskilled  or  unskilled  employment. 
Moreover, an apprenticeship is a necessary condition for further advancement 
to supervisory and other grades. This is as true of  white-collar as of  blue- 
collar employment. 
2. So long as an apprentice works reliably and effectively through the ap- 58  David Soskice 
prenticeship, he is likely to receive an offer of  employment  in  the training 
company. Thus the apprenticeship is a clear bridge from education to good em- 
ployment. 
3. The skilled worker’s certificate is an insurance policy against a worker’s 
having to leave the internal labor market. 
An apprenticeship in the handwerk sector is generally inferior to one in a 
larger company in  industry or services. But larger companies attach impor- 
tance to such apprenticeships in hiring semiskilled workers, who obtain some 
of  the same advantages as skilled workers from internal labor markets. And 
handwerk apprenticeships are a necessary condition for skilled employment in 
the hundwerk sector. 
The attractiveness of apprenticeships establishes why young people are pre- 
pared to accept low wages during the apprenticeship. Why do they work hard 
at school? First, and critically, the apprenticeship system caters to people in 
the 16-19  age group: thus failure at this stage is unlikely to be remedied by 
success later. Second, young people rank the desirability of different appren- 
ticeships. In general, to be accepted into a more desirable apprenticeship, bet- 
ter school performance  is required. Hence there is a strong incentive to im- 
prove school performance at any ability level, since such improvement may 
lead to a better apprenticeship. There is a contrast with lower ability levels in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, where marginal improvements in 
school performance have little impact on subsequent employment and training 
and where there is no disincentive to devote resources to training and educa- 
tion later. 
1 S.4  A High-Skill, High-Education Equilibrium 
The German apprenticeship system provides incentive structures for compa- 
nies and young people which support an equilibrium in which companies pro- 
vide high-quality training, in part because the academic ability of apprentices 
keeps the costs of  training sufficiently low, and in which young people take 
school education seriously because it leads to good training possibilities. Criti- 
cal to the incentives for companies and young people is the fact that neither 
side  must  miss out on  the  “apprenticeship  fair.”  It  is common knowledge 
among companies that this is where the best school-leavers gain entry to inter- 
nal labor markets: if companies miss out at this stage, they are less likely to get 
such good entrants later. Hence companies invest in attracting and screening 
applicants. This sets up a clear incentive structure for young people to invest 
sufficiently in school performance, to get apprenticeships at the best possible 
companies. Young people likewise know that to miss out at this stage makes 
subsequent entry much harder. 59  Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System 
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